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Software repositories contain information about source code, soft-
ware development processes, and team interactions. We combine
provenance of the development process with code security analysis
to automatically discover insights. This provides fast feedback on
the software’s design and security issues, which we evaluate on
projects that are developed under time pressure, such as Germany’s
COVID-19 contact tracing app ‘Corona-Warn-App’.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software security engineering; •
Software and its engineering→ Software libraries and repos-
itories; Software defect analysis; • Information systems→ Data
mining; •Human-centered computing→ Open source software.
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Software repositories contain much information besides the source
code itself. Especially for Open Source projects, the team compo-
sition and development process is transparent and traceable and
can be evaluated at any point of time by, for example, continuous
evaluation with regards to security by automated analysis [8].
The COVID-19 pandemic raises challenges for scientists of many
disciplines. Computer scientists and software developers help to
fight the pandemic with software systems, which must be devel-
oped under time pressure [2], with high quality, and with accepted
concepts for data security and privacy.
For example, apps for mobile devices that support contact tracing
of infected persons are useful to identify local COVID-19 hot-spots
and find other persons, who are potentially infected, too. For contact
tracing, several architectures are possible and have been discussed—
sometimes very controversial—in many countries. Two favoured
approaches are centralized and decentralized architectures; both
using Bluetooth Low Energy for contact identification. Apple and
Google developed an Exposure Notification API1 as extension of
their operating systems iOS and Android, which developers of ex-
posure notification apps can use for privacy-preserving contact
tracing. We focus on the German decentralized exposure notifica-
tion app Corona-Warn-App2 (CWA; see Section 2).
Our main contributions towards our vision of an automated,
provenance-driven security audit infrastructure for Open Source soft-
ware are:
• We give an overview of static code analysis, which we use
for our purpose (Section 3).
• We describe our method for querying the development pro-
cess by using provenance (Section 4).
• We outline our ongoing efforts on combining information
from process provenance with static code analysis for some
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2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE
“CORONA-WARN-APP”
The development of the Corona-Warn-App gets special attention
during the COVID-19 pandemic; the development had to be done
in a short time frame: development started in April 2020 and the
app was released on 16
th
June, 2020 for Android and iOS. CWA
is developed by SAP and Telekom using a transparent and open
development process. CWA has a decentralized architecture, ac-
companied by centrally-managed Java-based server applications
to distribute findings about infected users and store test results
uploaded by the laboratories.
CWA development history is publicly available from 12 reposi-
tories (some of them auxiliary), including data since April 29th, for
source code changes (5,624 git commits; Figure 1), issue tracking
(1,397 GitHub issues) and code review (2,144 GitHub pull requests)
3
.
The human team participating in the development is composed of
306 persons authoring code changes. Having into account the short
time span, this amounts to a considerable effort, and suggests that
most of the real activity is shown in these public repositories.
Figure 1: Code commits for the Corona-Warn-App reposito-
ries over time.
The analysis of the software development context for applica-
tions, by retrieving metadata from software repositories, has been
an active area of research since the early 2000s [14, 21]. During
this time several tools have been developed to get some metrics
about the software development process and the team building it.
We use GrimoireLab
4
, a toolset for retrieving data from software
development repositories, store it, and perform some analytics via
its SaaS instance Cauldron
5
to produce statistics for the CWA. In
this case, the context analysis ensures that the data analyzed for
provenance is likely real (e.g., it is not likely that the analyzed
repositories are not “dump repositories”, where code is copied from
time to time, while the real activity happens elsewhere), and gives
an idea of the volume of activity caused by the project. In a more
complete analysis, software development analytics may comple-
ment our provenance analysis by providing insights about how the
different actors behave in the project, and how their contributions
are related and processed.
3





3 CODE AUDIT WITH STATIC ANALYSIS
Static code analysis is a provenmethod for program analysis and can
be used as an early indicator for identifying pre-release defects [11].
Static analysis of program code spans a spectrum of tools, rang-
ing from linters, which check adherence of code to coding standards
on a syntactical level, to full-fledged verification tools, which for-
mally prove properties of the code. Checked properties also cover
multiple aspects of program code, including null pointer errors,
memory-related errors, concurrency bugs, taint-related problems
(i.e., data leaks and injection vulnerabilities). In our analysis, we
static analysis tools for Java, Kotlin, and Android (Table 1).
Table 1: Used static analysis tools.





Checkstyle linter, coding rules
Flowdroid taint analysis
SonarQube linter, coding rules
Static analysis tools can be integrated at various points in a
developer’s lifecycle, while coding in terms of IDE plugins, when
committing to a developer repository, either in batch mode or at
diff-time, or when conducting quality insurance.
The usability of static analysis is known to be influenced by
factors such as false-positive ratio, understandable and actionable
analysis results, and integration with developer workflow [7, 16].
Experiences in large-scale application of static analysis shows, that
integration with developer workflow and reporting bugs as soon
as possible is important.
For example, SonarCloud found a bug, which was introduced to
the repository “cwa-app-android” by the pull request #876 (Fig-
ure 2)
6
. The bug was found by SonarScanner before the pull request
was accepted and the appropriate line should be deleted. The vari-
able denomination fakeHeader gives a further hint, that this code
lines are probably debug code and should not be part of production
code.
Figure 2: Introduced bug ‘CWE-561 – Dead code’, ‘CWE-570 –
expression is always false’, detected by SonarQube Scanner.
6
Pull request #876 was no longer available at the time of publication. Other issues
found in the repository cwa-app-android by Sonarcloud are here: https://sonarcloud.
io/project/issues?id=corona-warn-app_cwa-app-android
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4 PROVENANCE OF REPOSITORIES
Software development is a highly complex process involving a wide
range of responsibilities and people. In addition the complexity of
the software itself grows over time. To cope with this different tools
are used to support the development process. During the entire soft-
ware development process, all these support tools produce several
types of data. These large amounts of data, which are generated
before, during, and after the development of a software, can be
analyzed using provenance [10].
Provenance analysis focusing on the development of open source
software projects provides insight into the interactions of people.
These interactions can fall into different categories. The most no-
table interactions in the development of track and trace software for
COVID-19 are those that scrutinise the nature of the data collected
and stored, which is hard for automated processes alone to evaluate
ethical considerations. This can be evident in the provenance by the
number of people collaborating outside of the development team,
the number of developers, and the issues reported. While these
types of measures cannot guarantee the ethics of the software, it
does provide an indication that it has been evaluated by humans.
4.1 Generating Retrospective Provenance for
git Repositories
To analyze the development process, we extract retrospective prove-
nance [9] from repositories and store it in a graph database for fur-






































Figure 3: Extracting provenance from git repositories.
projects we use tools, which crawl the git repositories and addi-
tional information, such as issues or pull requests (Git2PROV [3, 19]
and GitHub2PROV [13]). The provenance is generated as a file in
JSON format and then stored in a Neo4j graph database. We note
that while GitHub already provides visualisations for their hosted
projects, the GitHub2PROV model supports bespoke visualisations
that benefit from complex queries across the model’s graph struc-
ture, which are not achievable using GitHub’s API.
4.2 Using and Analyzing Provenance
To analyze the provenance graph, many visual and analytical meth-
ods exist; including semantic reasoning. For example, we illustrate
querying and using the provenance graph for a simple example
query for the CWA repository “cwa-server”: “Which files have
commits by team members as well as external contributors?”
We generate a Cypher query, that adds information about con-
tributors roles. We retrieve member information via the GitHub API
and store it in Python lists of team members and external contrib-
utors, which we insert in a Cypher template. This Cypher query
creates new directed relations between persons (PROV Agents) and
files (PROV Entities); for example, the relation for team members is:
(:Agent)-[:CONTRIBUTES_TO {role: 'team'}]->(:Entity).
Then we query for files, where team members and external
contributor made changes at any of the files revisions (Listing 1).
The query result is exported, either for visualization or as input for
the static code analysis (Section 5).
Listing 1: Find all files where a team member AND an exter-
nal contributor contributed changes.
MATCH
( team_member : Agent )−[ r1 : CONTRIBUTES_TO { r o l e : ' team ' } ]
−>( f : E n t i t y ) <−[ r2 : CONTRIBUTES_TO { r o l e : ' c o n t r i b u t o r ' } ]
−( e x t e r n a l _ c o n t r i b u t o r : Agent )
RETURN
team_member , f , e x t e r n a l _ c o n t r i b u t o r
5 RETROSPECTIVE CODE ANALYSIS FOR
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE PROJECTS
For conducting a security analysis of the CWA and its development
process, we integrate the extracted provenance (Section 4) with
bugs or vulnerabilities as reported by the selection of static analysis
tools (Section 3). In our infrastructure (Figure 4), we therefore
consider individual commit snapshots in the history of the CWA
repositories. According to the respective repository, we run certain
static analysis tools on a snapshot, track their reported findings
and save them into a database for later analysis.
Due to the various involved static analysis tools and their differ-
ing report formatting and output granularity, the tools’ findings
need to be consolidated such that, for example, duplicated findings
can be identified. The tools’ reports are therefore parsed to extract
the locations and types of found bugs or vulnerabilities; the latter is
additionally normalized using the Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE)
7
and other bug ontologies. Interlinking the tools findings




































Figure 4: Commit-hash related security analysis.
Using the combined information then allows various questions
for researching on the CWA development process and how security
has been addressed. For instance:
• Classical hypotheses of empirical software engineering, like
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the number of found vulnerabilities or bugs [12], can be
tested for the CWA case study.
• The usage of static analysis tools can be investigated, answer-
ing questions like how effective certain tools—or combina-
tions thereof—were in uncovering bugs or vulnerabilities [5]
or how understandable and usable their reports were [7].
• Characteristics of the vulnerability management in the CWA
app development process can be analyzed quantitatively,
using metrics like mean time to fix [6], or qualitatively, using
fault tree analysis.
6 RELATEDWORK
Baumgärtner et al. [1] categorized occurring security and privacy
risks of existing contact tracing app solutions from amethodological
point of view. They discussed different architectures, conducted an
experimental study, and created a movement profile of an infected
person with an early version of the DP3T app. A similar work by
Vaudenay [18] describes the data exchange of the decentralized
DP3T solution and possible attack scenarios on the communication,
which is always possible without hyperlocal data. He concludes,
that there are downsides in the design of decentralized apps and
shows improvements. Both works did not focus on the software
development itself.
Sun et al. [17] investigate the security of contact tracing applica-
tions by the use of static and dynamic analysis tools. They criticised,
that not all contact tracing app developers make their code publicly
available.
Wang et al. [20] analyzed the activities of much-contributing
developers to open source projects in an empirical study and looked
also on other repository artifacts besides the code. They investigated
the communication between developers and quality of software
with increasing contribution.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We described our vision for automated, provenance-driven security
analysis of git-based software repositories. A provenance graph
helps to discover hidden information from software repositories
and pinpoint to code changes where static analysis tools should
applied.
In the future, we apply our method on various software projects
where security of the software product is essential. This includes
developing tools and visualizations for developers to investigate
how software is developed, the processes used, and the details
around how security issues are identified and fixed.
Another future work is to capture code insertions and deletions
of individual commits by diff trees [4]. This would enable us to
enrich the provenance information; not just with the static code
view, via the analysis of commit snapshots, but also with a dynamic
view. As a result, sources and fixes of vulnerabilities identified by
static analysis could be better researched.
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